Somalia Famine Partly To Blame On War And Corruption: Analysts

Pupils of Lolkuta north primary school wait in the classroom for food distribution on July 21, 2011 in Wajir west (Simon Maina/AFP/Getty).

ABDI GULED and KATHARINE HOURELD 07/21/11 12:53 PM

 

MOGADISHU, Somalia — Somali soldiers beat back desperate families with gun butts Thursday as they fought for food supplies in front of a weeping diplomat, a day after the U.N. declared parts of the country were suffering from the worst famine in a generation.

"I will knock on every door I can to help you," the African Union envoy to Somalia, Jerry Rawlings, told the gathered families in the capital of Mogadishu.

Somalia's 20-year-old civil war is partly to blame for turning the drought in the Horn of Africa into a famine. Analysts warned that aid agencies could be airlifting emergency supplies to the failed state 20 years from now unless the U.N.-backed government improves.

"Corruption is a major part of the problem in Somalia," said Rashid Abdi, a Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. "This drought did not come out of nowhere, but the (Somali) government did not do anything to prepare for it. Instead they spent all their time fighting each other."

The U.N. has appealed for $300 million to over the next two months and aid agencies warn it will take at least $1 billion to provide emergency food, medicine and shelter for 11 million people in East Africa until the end of the year. Pictures of skeletal children and grief-stricken mothers stare out from Western newspapers in mute appeal.

The suffering is real. The U.N. believes tens of thousands have already died in the inaccessible interior, held by al-Qaida linked Islamist rebels who denied many aid agencies access for two years. The thorny scrub around the overflowing refugee camps in Kenya is littered with tiny corpses abandoned by mothers to weak to even dig their children a grave.

But Somalis will continue to suffer unless the international backers who support the Somali government also demand that it does a better job, said Abdirazak Fartaag, who headed the government's finance management unit until he fled the country after writing a report detailing tens of millions of dollars in missing donations from Arab nations.

"The Somalis are very grateful for what the international community is doing for them, but they need to be a bit more forceful in holding our politicians to account," Fartaag said.

Currently, the government only holds half of the capital with the help of 9,000 African Union peacekeepers. The salaries of 10,000 Somali soldiers are paid by the U.S. and Italy, and the police are paid by the European Union.

The rest of south-central Somalia is held by insurgents who kidnap children to use as child soldiers and carry out stonings and amputations. Last year, the group claimed responsibility for their first international terror attack, killing 76 people in Uganda.

Abdi said some Somali politicians continued to be corrupt because they gambled that the international community would not withdraw its support and allow the Islamists to take over the whole of southern Somalia.

"They know they're the only game in town," he said.

There may be some small signs of progress. This week, Somali President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed announced a new cabinet – the third in less than a year – and said his government had deposited $500,000 for drought relief in a public account that any donations can be sent to. Some displaced families in the capital said the government had distributed bananas and dried food.

But Fartaag said tens of millions of dollars more that could be used to help starving Somalis was missing. The port in the capital declared revenues just over $13 million last year, said port director Sayyed Ali Maalin Abdulle. Berbera port in the northern breakaway republic of Somaliland makes at least $30 million a year and is about a quarter of the size.

The E.U.'s humanitarian aid chief said Thursday that the famine offers a fresh chance to push for peace if local and international leaders step up.

"Perhaps we should see this crisis as an opportunity for more attention to be brought back to Somalia," Kristalina Georgieva told The Associated Press, noting that the worst drought in the region for 60 years had hit Somalia hardest because the government and infrastructure there are weakest.

"It might be that the incredible tragedy in Somalia ... is an opportunity for a renewed effort, and it has to be from the international community and the Somali people themselves and their leadership," she said.

In the meantime, Somali refugees continue to flood across the border into neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, where Prime Minister Raila Odinga said his government is concerned about the security threat caused by the influx and he urged aid groups to set up feeding camps in areas of Somalia not controlled by the militant group al-Shabab.

"It is possible to set up food camps there and tents so that they can live there," Odinga said. "Once (refugees) come to Kenya they don't want to go back. They say it is better to die in Kenya than in Somalia."

___

Houreld reported from Nairobi, Kenya. Associated Press reporters Tom Odula in Nairobi and Frank Jordans in Geneva contributed to this report.

 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/somalia-famine-war-corruption_n_905744.html

 

A Casualty Of The Somali Civil War

This entry was posted on April 13, 2010, in Favorites, Somalia, Travel and tagged Justin Ames, Somali Civil War, Somalia. Bookmark the permalink. Leave a comment

While driving through Somalia, we came across this battered tank – a casualty of the Somali civil war:

I was surprised to see that it still had its number plate:

The armed guard we hired, Mahamed Ali, poses next to the bombed-out tank for me:

This crude graveyard was just behind the tank which led me to wonder if it contained the remains of the tank crew and some of those accompanying it… Or perhaps it was the other way around and contains the remains of those that were fighting against the tank occupants?


http://thevelvetrocket.com/2010/04/13/a-casualty-of-the-somali-civil-war/
 

Somalia – Back In Club Mog

In January 2006, Sean Rorison travelled to Mogadishu, the war-torn, hellhole capital of Somalia, to see how the region is faring and what the future holds in store.

——

I first traveled to Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2002. Back then it was all quite a new experience to me – having ten armed guards surrounding you at any given time outside of your hotel compound, garish amounts of weaponry on every street corner, a blazing sun and countless bombed-out buildings. It was a realm of active conflict the like of which I had never seen before and have not seen since. Nothing on this planet comes close to Mogadishu – in terms of volatility, level of civilian firepower, and total lack of resolution. Southern Somalia still ranks at the very top – beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, beyond Chechnya. Pity, then, that we’ve all forgotten about it.

Three and a half years later I returned and learned more about the town. The shock of seeing how the city worked had worn off, my eyes had adjusted so to speak, and I could focus my attention more on the details of how life goes on… And it does: The city is divided into numerous areas controlled by warlords, and those warlords in turn protect their own populace and even seek to mitigate crime and chaos in their own little areas. Private ownership of weapons is high, but no higher than any other city where guns are legal. Militias roam the streets, and just like any other place that experiences gang warfare, people should expect to be hunted down if they start stirring things up.

Whilst other parts of Somalia have begun to sort themselves out – Somaliland in the north, and Puntland in the northeast, both sport their own democratically elected governments – southern Somalia still rules strictly by clan and guns, and the larger of either that you have behind you, the better off you’ll be. Across the arid shrublands of the south the entire region is divided amongst Somali clans, and then divided further between local leaders. Each leader needs their own protection to maintain influence over their respective territories. Mad Max indeed, but these people are far less unreasonable than one may think – they are interested in maintaining business ties and improving the lives of their own people as much as any other community leader. Indeed, no one inside their area of protection would call them a “warlord” per se, but instead would refer to them as the “Local Businessman” or “Community Representative” – a leader of sorts, no doubt leading by force of arms, but rarely if ever seen as something to be feared by the normal person. Unfortunately, no foreigner can be seen as ‘normal’ inside Mogadishu.

 

 

White people, or anyone not Somali for that matter, are exceedingly rare inside the city. Only one other fellow who departed with us on the flight to Mogadishu from Nairobi even stopped there – the others, four aid workers, continued north to the safer environs of Hargeisa, in Somaliland. The guy that disembarked at Mogadishu only appeared inside the city briefly to interview a parliamentarian at the same hotel I was staying at. The cost of arriving, and doing business, in the city, is astronomical: Ten men with machine guns guard you at every moment once you are outside of your compound, tailing your truck while your guide and driver navigate Mogadishu’s various routes to and from the hotel. Always changing routes, talking on mobile phones to confirm if one route is open or closed, or if daily fighting has shifted territories, once again necessitating a diversion to avoid checkpoints.

Conversely, going from one warlord’s territory to another requires phoning ahead with them so their militiamen can accompany your vehicles through their territory (requiring a fee of course), then doing the same thing again once you move into another territory. Handed off time after time between militias; paying each one as you go; observing tell-tale lines of debris on shattered roads as indications of where one territory ends and another begins; all of this is daily life in Mogadishu, and it is expensive, extortionate even, which may give an insight into why so few people even bother reporting on the Somali situation at all.

 

 

…And also why so few aid groups, charity organizations, and even the UN prefer to establish their missions in Somalia to somewhere else – mainly Nairobi. Out in the Gigiri district of Nairobi’s suburbs with the towering building that is the new American Embassy, past the lavish mansion with heated pool that is the Canadian Embassy, is a small town unto itself called UNOSOM (UN Operations Somalia). Over a dozen various agencies have taken over the shady terraces and walled mansions of this upscale neighbourhood; hung their signs out front, and continually wax poetic of how things ebb and flow in the Somali region. Random field reports arrive from the outer limits of Somali territory, or from Jowhar, the new capital of Somalia’s parliament that refuses to enter Mogadishu – because they believe it is too dangerous.

Too dangerous for some, but not for all. A rift in the recently appointed parliament meant that half of them were staying at our same hotel, several dozen of them, debating on where to move next – or what to do at all. Their philosophy was that if this newly arranged government did not establish itself in Mogadishu, then it was another hopeless cause already. Being in the capital would be critical to proving that they could exert control over the wider southern region and should be seen as its most important first mission. About two weeks following our departure, we heard they’d left for the countryside – to Baidoa, not Jowhar. So now this new government has split into two and has no presence whatsoever in the capital city.

 

 

This is a step backward from September of 2002, when a small government had at least established control of central Mogadishu. The TNG as it was called, Transitional National Government, was assembling various innocuous infrastructural changes such as license plates, traffic police, and had begun to draw up forms for various civilian institutions such as police stations. But once the TNG dissolved this went with it, and Mogadishu slipped back into its familiar anarchy. The new government was supposed to come in and fill this vacuum with a stronger parliamentary system, but that didn’t happen and, instead, the warlords quickly moved in and divided up the empty territory between themselves and shut the new government out entirely.

Which is not to say the warlords do not believe that a government should come into Mogadishu and establish control. One that we spoke to was even a minister in the new government, called the TFG – Transitional Federal Government. However, there is continuous disagreement on the makeup of the parliament and even after things have been decided, it only takes a few minor squabbles to bring the house of cards down again. For all the talk we heard of Somalis tiring from a lack of government and willingness to allow the new parliament to come in, their actions speak otherwise.

 

 

Islamic Courts, one of the largest institutions relied upon by people for some establishment of order, have been receiving funding from outside sources and have also been fighting with other warlords as of late. To those uninitiated in the world of Somali affairs this might look like the road to something akin to the Taliban in southern Somalia, but I wouldn’t count on it – Somalia’s problems stem from their fervent individualism and devotion to clan above all. And conversely, it is these things that ensure the conflict has not deteriorated even further down the spiral into absolute disarray. For all that doesn’t work in Mogadishu, there are vast ad-hoc networks that regulate business, crime, shipping, and even traffic. The more time you spend in the city, the deeper the whole mess gets – but the more order you see amid the chaos.

 

-Sean Rorison, April 2006

Al-Shabaab

AL- SHABAAB: Based in southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab is a so-called “clan-based insurgent and terrorist group,” which began as the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts in 2006. That year the group took over much of the southern region before being defeated in January 2007. Since then, the group has claimed an affiliation with al-Qaida. According to the National Counterterrorism Center, “the group has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in southern and central Somalia by recruiting, sometimes forcibly, regional sub-clans and their militias, using guerrilla asymmetrical warfare and terrorist tactics against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and its allies, African Union peacekeepers, and nongovernmental aid organizations.” Above, is a photo of militants belonging to the Al-Shabaab during a show of force in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu on Oct. 21, 2010.

(Stringer/AFP/Getty Images)

Pourquoi le raid pour libérer Denis Allex a échoué

le 08-02-2013 à 16h18 - Mis à jour le 10-02-2013 à 18h56

Par René Backmann
INFO OBS. Un mois après l'échec du raid de la DGSE en Somalie, le scénario de l'opération se précise.

L’analyse détaillée de l’opération lancée le 11 janvier, au sud de la Somalie, pour libérer Denis Allex, l’agent de la DGSE, détenu depuis juillet 2009 a permis de déterminer les causes précises de l’échec de ce raid, au terme duquel l’otage a été assassiné par ses geôliers tandis que deux membres du commando français étaient tués par les islamistes somaliens.

Contrairement à une rumeur qui avait circulé, ce n’est pas le bruit des rotors des hélicoptères Caracal qui transportaient le commando qui a donné l’alerte aux "shebabs".

Avec à leur bord une cinquantaine d’hommes du service Action de la DGSE et du Commandement des opérations spéciales (COS) les hélicoptères, qui avaient décollé du porte-hélicoptères "Mistral", au large de la côté somalienne – comme l’a révélé, peu après le raid, notre confrère Jean Guisnel – se sont en effet posés, par une nuit sans lune, à une dizaine de kilomètres du village de Bulo-Marer, où avaient été localisés (depuis des mois) l’otage et ses geôliers.

Les militaires savaient que pour éviter d’être entendus, les hélicoptères devaient se poser à 7 km au moins de leur cible. Pour réduire tout risque, ils ont décidé de porter la marge de sécurité à 10 km. Et c’est sans problème et sans être détectés que les membres du commando, équipés de systèmes de vision nocturne, et solidement armés sont arrivés jusqu’au village de Bulo-Marer et même à proximité du bâtiment ou était détenu Denis Allex. Grâce au travail de repérage accompli depuis de longs mois, la configuration des lieux leur était familière.
Deux imprévus pour le commando

Ce qui n’était pas prévisible, c’est que quelques instants avant de lancer leur assaut, ils ont été aperçus par un villageois – ou un combattant islamiste – qui a donné l’alerte. Alors que l’effet de surprise était l’une des composantes majeures de l’opération, ils se sont retrouvés face au groupe qui détenait Denis Allex renforcé par plusieurs dizaines de combattants.

Deuxième surprise : malgré l’énorme quantité d’informations glanées depuis des mois, les membres du commando ignoraient que l’armement du groupe qui détenait Denis Allex ne se composait pas uniquement de Kalachnikov, mais d’armes beaucoup plus puissantes.

C’est sous un feu nourri et meurtrier qu’ils ont dû se replier en emmenant un blessé grave – mort, à bord du Mistral – et en laissant sur le terrain l’un d’entre eux, dont le cadavre a été exhibé par les "shebabs". Quant à Denis Allex il semble qu’il ait été abattu par ses gardiens dès le début de l’attaque.

 

AFRIQUE/SOMALIE - Le danger représenté par les engins explosifs sur l’ensemble du territoire demeure élevé

Mogadiscio (Agence Fides) – Des milliers de mines antipersonnel et d’autres engins explosifs n’ayant pas explosé éparpillés dans différentes zones de Somalie au cours des dernières décennies de conflit constituent actuellement une nouvelle menace pour la relative sécurité acquise par le pays. Selon les experts, les instruments adéquats en vue de la bonification des terrains en question font défaut. La zone est du pays, à la frontière entre la Somalie et l’Ethiopie, est l’une des zones où les engins en question sont les plus nombreux, y ayant été semés lors du conflit de 1977. En sont également infestées les villes impliquées dans les affrontements plus récents entre les troupes régulières et les groupes de miliciens rebelles d’Al-Shabaab. Selon le Bureau des Nations unies s’occupant des actions contre les mines (UNMAS), une nouvelle menace provient des usines qui conservent des stocks d’explosifs, d’armes abandonnées, de munitions et d’engins explosifs artisanaux. L’UNMAS affirme que la majeure partie des communautés du Sud de la Somalie et du centre du pays sont fortement infestées par des restes explosifs de guerre alors que les compétences et le soutien nécessaires pour faire face à cette menace ne sont présents que dans quelques-unes des régions intéressées. La région centrale de Galgadud est pleine de restes explosifs de guerre. La zone se trouve à la frontière avec l’Ethiopie et a servi de base aux forces armées somaliennes qui y ont abandonné des explosifs et des armes lors de la chute du gouvernement. Les régions de Bakool, Bay et Hiraan, dans le centre sud du pays, sont également envahies par les mines tout comme la bande d’Afgoye et certains quartiers de Mogadiscio où, outre aux restes explosifs de guerre, sont présentes également des mines antipersonnel et anti-char. En 2012, au moins huit enfants sont morts dans une explosion ayant eu lieu dans la ville de Balad, dans la région du Moyen Shabelle. Selon l’UNMAS, en 2011, les mines antipersonnel ont causé 4% des décès et des blessures en Somalie alors que les engins explosifs n’ayant pas explosé en ont causé 55% et d’autres types d’engins explosifs 32%. La Somalie a signé en 2012 la Convention interdisant les mines antipersonnel, qui prévoit la destruction des résidus de guerre dans les quatre ans ainsi que la bonification complète du territoire du pays dans les dix ans. Au cours des cinq dernières années, plus de 21.461 engins explosifs n’ayant pas explosé et autres mines antipersonnel ont été détruits en Somalie.

(AP) (Agence Fides 04/02/2013)