UNITED STATES PSYOP IN SOMALIA (1/4)

Herbert A. Friedman

I have hesitated in writing about the Psychological operations (PSYOP) planned and carried out during the United Nations intervention in Somalia simply because there are so many items to describe and so much data already written about that brief African adventure. The leaflets alone number close to 100, and if we add in the handbills, posters and other items, there are well over 100. I did write a short report entitled "A Brief Look at Propaganda over Somalia," for the winter 1994 issue of Perspectives, the Journal of the Psychological Operations Association. In that report, I illustrated and translated four UNITAF leaflets, including the first two that we show further down in this article. This time we will study the operation in much greater depth. Because of the number of PSYOP products involved, we will select and show only those that are particularly interesting.

American newspapers seem to get excited about wars and famines in foreign countries in cycles. At one time, they would write headlines and print numerous articles and editorials about the Guerrilla wars in Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and a host of other Central and South American nations. For a few weeks the headlines would be full of pictures and stories about the death and destruction, and then their interest would wane and they would go on to another hot topic. The wars still go on, and people are still dying, but the newspapers have lost interest.

We have seen the very same sort of cyclic activity when it comes to mass starvation, drought and famine in Africa. The newspapers will depict photographs of starving children with bloated bellies, weeping mothers, and bone-dry fields where nothing grows. It might be Ethiopia, the Congo, Somalia, or more recently, Liberia. After a few weeks, the journalists move on, no longer interested in the starving children. They still die, but the publishers have sold their papers and it is time to find another disaster to publicize and exploit.

In some ways, this is how the United States became involved in Somalia. For weeks, the newspapers told of the suffering people and the warlords who kept them starving and in poverty. The United Nations clamored for a military force to protect food shipments, the newspapers demanded that the United States be part of that force, and slowly and gradually, the American military found itself unwillingly sucked into the vortex that is Africa.

A host of local petty warlords and clans ruled Somalia. They fought bitterly to control their small parcels of barren land and starving citizens. This was especially true in the capitol city of Mogadishu. The situation was so bad in that city that it was estimated that 500,000 Somalis would die of starvation in 1992. President Bush found himself under tremendous pressure to send American troops to protect relief workers and the food shipped to the starving nation. He finally authorized the deployment of American troops in an operation called Restore Hope.

The Army Times of 14 December 1992 lists the major warlords and their organizations:

Somali National Movement – Abdul Rahman Tur.
Somali Salvation Democratic Front – Colonel Tusuf.
United Somali Congress (Aideed faction) General Mohammed Farah Aideed.
United Somali Congress (Ali Mahdi faction) Ali Mahdi Muhammed.
Somali National Front – General Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan.
Somali Patriotic Movement – Colonel Omar Jess.

First, a history of the United Nations political and military activity in Somalia. This information is courtesy of the United Nations Department of Public Information.

The United Nations in Somalia, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 1993, says:

The downfall of President Siad Barre on 27 January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital Mogadishu, between two factions - one supporting interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aided. Since then, fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Some declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others have not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem.

An article entitled  “Crisis in Somalia,” published in the booklet Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping adds in part:

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was set up to facilitate humanitarian aid to people trapped by civil war and famine. The mission developed into a broad attempt to help stop the conflict and reconstitute the basic institutions of a viable State.

General Mohamed Farah Aideed

From November 1991, there was heavy fighting in the Somali capital of Mogadishu between armed elements allied to General Mohamed Farah Aideed, or to Mr. Ali Mohamed Mahdi, the appointed "interim President," and yet other factions. In addition to Mogadishu, there was conflict in Kismayo, and in the northwest, local leaders were pushing to create an independent "Somaliland". The country as a whole was without any form of central government. Banditry was rife.

The fighting that followed, with clans and sub-clans constituted in loose alliances without central control, took place at a time of serious drought. That combination proved disastrous for the population at large. By 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the country, faced starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases. The magnitude of suffering was immense. Overall, an estimated 300,000 people, including many children, died. Some 2 million people, violently displaced from their home areas, fled either to neighboring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. All institutions of governance and at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure disintegrated.

Meanwhile, conditions within Somalia continued to deteriorate for the great majority of its people. In resolution 767(1992) of 27 July 1992, the Security Council approved the proposal to establish four operational zones - Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo - and strongly endorsed sending a technical team to Somalia. On 24 August 1992, the Secretary-General requested an increase in the authorized strength of UNOSOM to create the four operational zones. For each zone, UNOSOM would receive a military unit of 750 personnel. The total strength of United Nations security personnel envisaged for Somalia thus rose to 3,500. On 28 August, the Security Council, by resolution 775 (1992), authorized the increase. On 8 September, it agreed to a further addition of three logistical units, raising the total authorized strength of UNOSOM to 4,219 troops and 50 military observers. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992.

Somali “technicals” armed vehicles

Implementing the program proved difficult. Continuing disagreements among Somali factions on the United Nations role made the countrywide and more effective deployment of UNOSOM impossible. On 28 October, General Mohamed Farah Aideed declared that the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion must leave Mogadishu. He also ordered the expulsion within 48 hours of the UNOSOM Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance. Subsequently, General Mohamed Farah Aideed's forces shelled and shot at UNOSOM forces controlling the airport, and Mr. Ali Mohamed Mahdi's forces shelled ships carrying food as they attempted to enter Mogadishu port. General Aideed objected to United Nations control of the airport; Mr. Ali Mohamed Mahdi wanted UNOSOM to take full control of the port. On 13 November, after coming under machine-gun, rifle and mortar fire, the Pakistani troops controlling the airport returned fire. In the absence of a government capable of maintaining law and order, relief organizations experienced increased hijacking of vehicles, looting of convoys and warehouses, and detention of expatriate staff.

The N.Y. Times of 2 January 1993 discusses the warlords:

General Aideed controls most of southern Somalia, including a large part of Mogadishu, while Mr. Ali Mahdi presides over northern Mogadishu…other key figures include General Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan who controls the town of Bardera, and Colonel Omar Jess, who controls Kismayu.

On 3 December 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 794. The Council welcomed the United States offer to help create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia and authorized, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the use of "all necessary means" to do so. United States President George Bush responded to Security Council resolution 794 with a decision on 4 December to initiate Operation Restore Hope, under which the United States would assume the unified command.

We should point out that before the actual start of military operations in Somalia the United States had tried to quietly feed the people using civilian agencies. This is discussed in the booklet, U.S. Army in Somalia 1992-1994. It says:

In response to the worsening famine, the United States decided to assist the relief efforts by airlifting food from nearby Kenya to remote airfields in the interior of Somalia for distribution, thus bypassing congested ports and reducing the need to send out easily looted convoys. For this purpose, the United States launched Operation PROVIDE RELIEF on 15 August 1992. The actual ground distribution continued to be accomplished by the international relief organizations already established in the country. PROVIDE RELIEF was thus a limited attempt to use U.S. expertise in logistics to help the relief effort without engaging American military forces on the ground.

Problems of distribution within the country continued to hamper the relief effort. In the countryside, lawless gangs seized relief supplies and used them to buy local loyalties while letting thousands starve. In the cities, the warring political factions, supported by their private armies, amassed food stockpiles as bargaining chips and signs of their power. These rival entities, often barely controlled by their clan leaders, terrorized the international organizations, stealing food and killing whoever did not pay protection money.

The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) came ashore on the beaches of Mogadishu without opposition on 9 December 1992. The first PSYOP soldiers deployed from Fort Bragg to Mombasa, Kenya, where they joined the U.S. 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the USS Tripoli. They accompanied the initial Marine landing at Mogadishu. 1,300 marines flew by helicopter directly to Mogadishu airport. Navy Seals landed quietly and stealthily in the dark before dawn and were immediately blinded by the blazing lights of television crews who had been told of their arrival. The U.S. Army component of UNITAF was Task Force Mountain. TF Mountain was built around the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and at its peak consisted of approximately 10,000 soldiers including two infantry battalions, an aviation brigade, and division artillery and support assets. While conventional forces concentrated on major cities and regions, U.S. Special Operations Forces moved quickly to establish a presence in the rest of the countryside, place liaison cells with allied forces, and conduct civil affairs and psychological operations.

Over the next several weeks, eight tactical PSYOP teams accompanied UNITAF ground forces as they deployed throughout central and southern Somalia to secure relief convoys and to promote stability. On 13 December, United States forces had secured the airfield at Baledogle, and by 16 December, they had seized Baidoa. The number of United States forces would rise to approximately 28,000 personnel, augmented by some 17,000 UNITAF troops from over 20 countries.

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He indicated that since the adoption of Council resolution 794 in December 1992, UNITAF had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's territory. The presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, despite the improvement, incidents of violence continued. There was still no effective functioning government in the country, no organized civilian police and no disciplined national army.

The Security Council established UNOSOM II by resolution 814 on 26 March 1993. UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF in May 1993 and ended March 1995. It consisted of approximately 28,000 military and police personnel; there was also a provision for some 2,800 international and locally recruited staff. UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. UNOSOM II was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure. In February 1994, after several violent incidents and attacks on United Nations soldiers, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods.

PSYOP in Somalia

Looking at my own notes from 1992-1993, I see under “General Information” the following comments:

“UNOSOM was established 24 April 1992 to monitor the cease-fire, provide security, and escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centers. There were about 3,500 UN troops originally assigned. An additional 3,500 troops joined the force in August 1992 to protect convoys and distribution centers.

The United Nations authorized UNITAF on 3 December 1992. The United States led it with about 28,000 troops. Operation Restore Hope originated 9 December 1992. Another 20 nations would send troops for a total force of about 37,000 peacekeepers. The mission was to ‘use all force necessary to establish a secure environment.’

The United Nations authorized UNOSOM II on 3 March 1993. It was the first peacekeeping operation authorized to use force. The mission was to effect a political reconciliation and transfer of power to a civilian institution. The first force commander was Lieutenant General Cevik Bir of Turkey. The manpower was about 20,000 combat troops, 8,000 logistical troops, and 2,800 civilians.

The United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) disseminated 37 leaflets between 9 December 1992 and 4 May 1993.

U.S. Army in Somalia 1992-1994 adds:

Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir was appointed commander of the UNOSOM II force, with U.S. Army Major General Thomas M. Montgomery as his deputy. General Montgomery also retained his position as commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia Thus the U.S. forces retained their own national chain of command while inserting themselves into the UN structure. By October 1993 UNOSOM II consisted of over 16,000 peacekeepers from 21 nations. This number would jump to 29,732 soldiers from 29 nations by mid-November with the arrival of over 17,000 additional U.S. personnel as part of a U.S. joint task force.

The 4th PSYOP Group published a book entitled Psychological Operations in Support of Operation Restore Hope in late 1993. It gives background on the early aspects of the operations:

PSYOP was a key Battlefield Operating System used extensively to support UNITAF operations.  In order to maximize the PSYOP impact, we established a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) under the supervision of the director of operations, and limited the PSYOP focus to the operational and tactical levels.

The JPOTF was comprised of approximately 125 members of the U.S. Army’s 4th PSYOP Group, and several of its subordinate battalions, the 8th (command and control), the 9th, (a tactical loudspeaker battalion), the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion and one U.S. Navy sailor and a dozen Somali linguists. The JPOTF worked with coalition forces, senior U.S. and U.N. civilians, and nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations. The JPOTF designed, produced and disseminated thirty-seven different leaflets; large numbers of more than a dozen different handbills and posters; issued 116 editions of a Somali language UNITAF newspaper RAJO (Hope) with as many as 25,000 copies printed and distributed daily to every town and village where UNITAF forces were deployed; transmitted radio broadcasts twice daily; produced and disseminated more than seven million leaflets over central and southern Somalia; deployed tactical PSYOP teams with the coalition forces; and provided advice to the U.S. special envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff.

A detachment of the 9th PSYOP Battalion was attached to the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. The arrangement is described by Captain James C. Boisselle in an article entitled "Detachment B910 in Operation Restore Hope: Operations and Lesson Learned," in Perspectives - the Journal of the Psychological Operations Association, spring 1994. Some of CPT Boisselle's comments are: 

The mission was to plan, coordinate, and execute PSYOP in support of the 2nd Brigade of the United Task Force campaign plan. The Brigade's initial focus was combat operations such as reaction to ambush, raid cordon and search...initially the role of tactical PSYOP in support of these operations was straight forward; induce surrender, deter resistance, and prevent civilian interference.

A day or two before the arrival of forces, the PSYOP plan was executed. This usually consisted of a leaflet drop explaining certain 'rules' and face-to-face messages conveying the US forces' operations. Once an area had been stabilized and relief supplies were again moving, Detachment B910 conducted follow-up assessments and developed programs to help achieve PSYOP objectives.

I should point out that the story does not end with the UNITAF leaflets. When UNOSOM II took over for UNITAF, they produced another entire series of leaflets, even more extensive than the UNITAF series. 

The PsyWar Society published a booklet in April 1995 entitled Illustrated Catalogue of UNITAF Aerial Leaflets used in Support of Operation Restore Hope, Somalia, 9 December 1992 – 4 May 1993. As I gathered the leaflets, I numbered them 1 through 37. The booklet numbered them with the prefix PSN followed by S1, S2, etc. I will use their codes simply because it is easier for the reader to follow a published reference. Unfortunately, the leaflets are uncoded so any numbering system is completely arbitrary.

United States Marines CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters dropped the first two leaflets (S1 and S2) over Mogadishu on 9 December. Because of small arms fire, the initial drops were from 1,000-5,000 feet. Later drops were from 500-1,000 feet. United States Air Force C-130 Hercules also dropped leaflets on Somalia. The leaflets were initially printed at Fort Bragg, NC, on the 4th PSYOP Group’s Heidelberg print presses. The leaflets are discussed in detail by LTC Charles P. Borchini in a Special Warfare article entitled “PSYOP in Somalia – The Voice of Hope.” He says:

The initial landing of U.S. forces in Mogadishu on 9 December was preceded by a drop of approximately 220,000 leaflets from a U.S. Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter. This operation used two kinds of leaflets to announce the arrival of U.S. forces and to alert inhabitants of the need for convoy-security missions. The “handshake” leaflet communicated the basic message that the intent of the mission was to assist, not harm Somalis; the convoy security leaflet stressed that coalition troops would use force to protect the relief shipments. These three-by-six-inch leaflets had been printed at Fort Bragg by the 4th PSYOP Group.

Throughout the operation, PSYOP teams, using U.S. C-130s, U.S. Marine CH-53s, U.S. Army UH-60s and UH-1s, and a Canadian C-130, continued to drop the two leaflets along major supply routes. The handshake leaflets were dropped two or three days prior to the arrival of UNITAF forces in each town; the convoy leaflets were dropped two or three days afterward. During one operation, PSYOP teams used U.S. Navy S-3 Viking fixed-wing aircraft to jettison 60 canisters, each carrying 2,500 leaflets, over the target area. With the gradual redeployment of U.S. C-130s, leaflet missions were also conducted from New Zealand "Andovers," a smaller version of the DC-3.

Convoy Leaflet

The very first leaflet clearly shows the intent of the United Nations resolution. It depicts a military food convoy protected by armed high mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles (Humvees) and helicopters. Happy Somalis wave at the convoy. There are numerous ways to interpret and translate the Somali language. I will use that translation that seems to best fit the intent of the leaflet. Text on the front is, “We are here to protect relief convoys! Do not block the roads.” The back depicts a UN symbol, an American flag, and the text “Our forces are here to defend the people helping you Do not get involved in any manner. Do not block the roads! Force will be used to protect the convoys.”

A young Somali boy holding the handshake leaflet

Handshake Leaflet

To be continued

Source : http://www.psywarrior.com/SomaliaHerb.html

DÉCLARATION À LA PRESSE DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ SUR LA SOMALIE

NEW YORK, 6 avril 2012/African Press Organization (APO)/ -- On trouvera ci-après le texte de la déclaration à la presse faite le 5 avril par le Président du Conseil de sécurité pour le mois d'avril, Mme Susan Rice (États-Unis):

Les membres du Conseil de sécurité ont condamné dans les termes les plus énergiques l'attentat terroriste perpétré à Mogadiscio (Somalie) le 4 avril 2012, qui a causé la mort de civils innocents et en a blessé d'autres. Cet attentat témoigne d'un profond mépris pour la vie des Somaliens et pour leur volonté de retrouver une vie normale à Mogadiscio. Les membres du Conseil ont exprimé leur profonde sympathie et leurs plus vives condoléances aux victimes de ce crime odieux et à leurs proches, ainsi qu'au peuple somalien et au Gouvernement fédéral de transition.

Les membres du Conseil ont réitéré leur appui sans réserve aux efforts déployés par le Gouvernement fédéral de transition en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité et de la réconciliation, dans le cadre du Processus de paix de Djibouti, ainsi qu'à l'action menée par les Forces somaliennes de sécurité et la Mission de l'Union africaine en Somalie (AMISOM). Ils ont de nouveau condamné tous les actes de violence et d'incitation à la violence commis à l'encontre de civils, de l'AMISOM et du Gouvernement fédéral de transition.

Les membres du Conseil ont réaffirmé que le terrorisme, sous toutes ses formes et manifestations, constitue l'une des menaces les plus sérieuses contre la paix et la sécurité et que tous les actes de terrorisme, quels qu'ils soient, sont criminels et injustifiables, quels qu'en soient les motivations, le lieu, l'époque et les auteurs.

Les membres du Conseil ont redit leur détermination à combattre le terrorisme sous toutes ses formes, conformément aux responsabilités qui incombent au Conseil en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies.

Les membres du Conseil ont rappelé aux États qu'ils ont l'obligation de veiller à ce que toutes les mesures qu'ils prennent pour lutter contre le terrorisme soient conformes à leurs obligations au regard du droit international, en particulier celui des droits de l'homme et des réfugiés, et du droit humanitaire.

Provided by PR Newswire

Source : http://www.starafrica.com/fr/actualites/detail-news/view/declaration-a-la-presse-du-conseil-de-se-226471.html

Les fusiliers marins néerlandais inaugurent le concept de aVPD

avr 7, 2012
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde

Mise en place de barbelés permettant une protection passive du navire (crédit : marine néerlandaise)

(BRUXELLES2, exclusif) C’est un fait sans doute peu connu. Mais c’est une équipe militaire embarquée (EPE en français, VPD en anglais) qui assure en ce moment la protection des navires du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) ravitaillant la Somalie. Une aide indispensable : environ 1,7 millions de personnes dans ce pays dépendent de l’aide alimentaire internationale. Un concept détaillé et présenté à Bruxelles lors d’un séminaire sur la piraterie auquel B2 a participé.

L’accompagnement des bateaux du PAM, c’est la mission première et originale de l’opération anti-piraterie de l’UE. Sans cette action, il parait peu probable d’ailleurs que cette opération ait pu voir le jour. Mais ce n’est pas une sinécure, tous les jours, à entendre les officiers européens. Certains bateaux du PAM sont de vieux bateaux, poussifs. Et leur accompagnement prend donc largement plus de temps que sur un navire moderne. La programmation du PAM n’est pas non plus des plus précises. Le déchargement ou chargement du navire de nourriture est souvent soumis à différents impératifs portuaires, plus ou moins imprévisibles. Difficile alors de tenir le planning prévu ; les militaires doivent alors attendre, ce qui n’est sans conséquences sur les autres missions.

Le concept de VPA autonomes (aVPD) est donc un « sacré soulagement » pour la mission Eunavfor. Cela « nous ôte une belle épine du pied - confirme le capitaine de vaisseau Gelly (d’Eunavfor) -, cela nous permet de libérer au moins un navire de guerre, voire plus, entre aller chercher un navire, l’accompagner, puis le récupérer ». Dans les faits, c’est presqu’un tiers de la flotte de la mission européenne qui se trouve ainsi libérée et peut être utilisée sur d’autres actions comme les patrouilles d’observation le long de la côte somalienne ou la « course » aux pirates.

Le concept de VPD Autonome
Une aVPD doit être considérée comme une « entité militaire à part entière – à la différence d’une VPD dépendant d’un navire de guerre, extension organique de ce navire ». Il faut l’accord de l’État du pavillon, de l’armateur, l’accord tacite et entente directe avec le capitaine, seul responsable à bord. « Nous n’avons pas défini de standard même de taille de la VPD. C’est une politique de libre contribution. Chaque pays membre propose ce qu’il souhaite. Nous travaillons ensuite avec le PAM pour aménager le bateau » explique le CV Gelly.

Ce concept n’est cependant pas entièrement nouveau puisqu’il a été utilisé – avec succès par les Français – à bord des navires de pêche. Et est utilisé également par les Néerlandais, depuis peu, pour protéger certains navires marchands sensibles, ainsi que par les Italiens (avec la déconvenue que l’on connait avec la mort de deux pêcheurs et le litige avec l’Inde). En revanche, au sein d’une opération multinationale, c’est une première.

La mise en place de VPD a nécessité une intense préparation diplomatique et juridique. L’Union européenne a, en effet, dû passé des accords avec les Etats du pavillon des navires du PAM. Eunavfor a ainsi passé six accords aujourd’hui, d’abord avec le Liberia, St Vincent & Grenadines, Sierra Leone, puis avec les Iles Marshall, le Panama, Antigua & Barbuda qui ont accepté que des équipes VPD européennes embarquent à bord des navires battant leur pavillon.

Des fusiliers marins à demeure sur le Caroline Scan
Sur le Caroline Scan, un navire moderne affrété par le Programme alimentaire mondial. Précisons « moderne » car apparemment ce n’est pas le cas de tous les navires, pour certains, naviguer relève apparemment du « miracle ». Les 18 fusiliers marins néerlandais ont dû trouver leur place, ce qui n’est pas évident sur un navire, d’une centaine de mètres de long mais avant tout destiné à amener un maximum de fret. Des logements ont ainsi aménagés dans des containers sur le pont, containers disposant de l’air conditionné. L’équipe néerlandaise est plutôt plus nombreuse que d’autres pays. Elle dispose de tout l’équipement pour pouvoir répondre au feu, notamment une mitrailleuse lourde. « « Le personnel doit être capable à tout moment de pouvoir faire face à une attaque » précise un officier néerlandais. Elle est également dotée d’une équipe médiale – docteur, infirmier – et du matériel (oxygène, réanimation…) nécessaire « pour garantir tous les soins aux équipes » et avoir une certaine autonomie.

Règles d’engagement et de tir
Les VPD restent soumis à une discipline militaire et à des règles d’engagement au feu de façon précise. Des règles qui diffèrent légèrement de la simple « légitime défense » à laquelle sont astreints les gardes privés. Les militaires peuvent agir, selon une gradation de moyens, de manière à prévenir une attaque et non pas uniquement si un premier tir les atteint (légitime défense). Il y a une gradation de la dissuasion : avec d’abord des messages d’avertissement diffusés par radio et tir de dissuasion.

L’objectif est vraiment de « dissuader les pirates d’attaquer le navire ». « L’utilisation de la force est basée sur des principes de proportionnalité et de subsidiarité : la force ne doit être utilisée que s’il y a une menace, et pas d’autre moyen disponible. L’usage de la force est limité. On ne peut ainsi poursuivre les pirates. Cela ne signifie pas que la force ne peut pas être utilisée uniquement quand il y a attaque et déclenchement feu par pirates. La légitime défense peut être déclenchée dès qu’il y a attaque » témoigne un officier néerlandais. En cas d’attaque, il y a une répartition des tâches à bord entre le capitaine, responsable de la marche du navire, et le commandant des VPD, de la sécurité.

La délicate question des armes
La question du transport des armes à bord reste un point délicat. Les Néerlandais disposent d’une réserve de munitions à Malte (*) où certains équipements sont stockés. Le passage par Suez nécessite quelques formalités. « Nous devons débarquer les armes avant le passage et les récupérer à la sortie – les autorités égyptiennes transportent sur terre – cela demande contacts diplomatiques supplémentaire et le versement d’une taxe. » Ce transfert n’est évidemment pas gratuit. « Ce n’est pas extrêmement cher à l’unité. Mais il y a un effet multiplicateur au nombre » précise notre officier.

Les frais gelés
Une partie des coûts est, normalement, pris en charge par le budget commun (mécanisme Athena) : les logements, le coût des communications satellites (même si c’est, en pratique, difficile d’isoler ces dépenses) et les transferts. C’est pour l’instant théorique, car la ligne budgétaire de 1,8 millions d’euros prévue dans le budget communautaire est gelée. Deux pays – l’Allemagne… et les Pays-Bas – ont particulièrement milité pour ce gel. (Ironie, s’abstenir . Une prochaine réunion du comité Athena est sensée discuter de la possibilité de « décongeler » la ligne budgétaire.

Une seule offre
Un seul Etat membre a, pour l’instant, fait une offre de VPD autonome, mais d’autres pourraient suivre : l’Italie par exemple. Et à Northwood, on s’attend à des contributions « intéressantes » pour le second semestre 2012 et surtout en 2013. Les Pays-Bas utilisent d’ailleurs la technique du VPD autonome pour accompagner les navires marchands battant le pavillon du Royaume. « Nous avons actuellement 4 équipes de VPD en simultané, qui transitent environ durant 3 semaines. Et nous avons prévu d’utiliser 60 équipes VPD par an. Mais nous travaillons pour rehausser le dispositif » précise notre interlocuteur néerlandais. « Si nous pouvons transporter l’équipe, d’un navire à l’autre nous le faisons, elle reste là quelques jours… Les complications sont souvent importantes quand on fait venir les matériels par les airs. »

(*) On peut se demander s’il n’y aurait pas quelques économies et mises en synergies possibles, notamment en établissant ce stock à Djibouti dans la base française ou au FHQ d’Atalanta, ou encore à la Réunion ou Mayotte (département français)

Source : http://www.bruxelles2.eu/piraterie-maritime/les-fusiliers-marins-neerlandais-inaugurent-le-concept-de-vpda.html

LA BUNDESWEHR DEBARQUE EN SOMALIE, Jeudi 22 juillet 1993

La première intervention à l'étranger de l'armée allemande depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale a débuté hier. Un groupe de 51 soldats allemands est arrivé en Somalie pour prêter main-forte aux troupes des Nations unies déployées dans le pays. Le Boieng 707 qui transportait le contingent s'est posé à Mogadiscio, la capitale somalienne, précédant un autre avion qui transportait un second groupe de 200 hommes.

La constitution allemande interdit à la Bundeswehr - l'armée allemande - de participer à des actions offensives à l'extérieur, mais reste floue sur ses missions à l'étranger. Un arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle et une décision du Bundestag - le parlement - ont permis cette «première» humanitaire.

Les troupes allemandes seront déployées dans la zone relativement calme de Belet Huen, à près de 300 kilomètres de Mogadiscio. Les responsables de l'ONU craignent en effet que les soldats allemands ne deviennent des cibles de choix pour les miliciens somaliens, puisqu'ils ne peuvent faire usage de leurs armes qu'en cas de légitime défense. Les 20.000 soldats des 26 autres pays du contingent de l'ONU sont, quant à eux, autorisés à conduire des opérations offensives de maintien de la paix, conformément à la charte de l'organisation.

Le déploiement du contingent allemand qui doit compter environ 1.600 hommes, tous volontaires, sera achevé le mois prochain. Ce contingent sera composé de 250 soldats d'infanterie. Les 1.350 autres seront des ingénieurs, des spécialistes des transmissions et de la signalisation, membres d'état-major et logisticiens.

Selon le lieutenant-colonel Sontheim, chef de la mission, la tâche des soldats allemands sera d'assurer un soutien logistique général aux autres troupes de l'ONU ainsi qu'aux organisations humanitaires. Nous fournirons eau, rations alimentaires, essence, et nous aiderons à l'entretien des routes et des aires d'atterrissage. Notre mission ne prévoit pas l'escorte des convois d'aide humanitaire, mais nous pourrions protéger le personnel des organisations humanitaires. Près de 2.000 sympathisants du général Aïdid ont manifesté contre l'arrivée des Allemands. (AFP.).

Source : archives.lesoir.be

AMISOM has launched two key projects in Mogadishu

Mogadishu‐March 30th, 2012;
AMISOM has  launched two key projects in Mogadishu with funding from the governments of Denmark and Sweeden. The projects are; Rehabilitation of four water wells in Hamarwyne, Hamarjabjab, Wadajir and Darkenely districts and construction of a primary school in Wadajir Disitrict.



Source : http://amisom-au.org/2012/04/3136/?lang=fr

Somalia: On Scene in Baidoa After Ethiopia's Rout of Al-Shabab

Mar 12, 2012

People in Somalia’s third-largest city are so glad the radical Islamist group is gone, they don’t even mind being occupied—yet.

The previous occupants of the crumbling palace left its interior covered with multicolored chalk drawings and painted graffiti. The childishly rendered pictures give the place a kind of schoolroom look. That is, except for the subject matter: AK-47s and tanks spewing bullets and flames; exploding airplanes; cellphones, complete with painstakingly detailed buttons, the detonators of choice for the roadside bombs that are used by the Islamist radicals of Al-Shabab. Guiding us through Somalia’s onetime presidential palace in Baidoa, Capt. Mahamoud Yissak seems almost regretful for the fighters, who mostly fled when the Ethiopian Army captured the city. “They’re only teenagers,” the Ethiopian officer says. “They think only about jihad.”

The building now serves as a command center for the Ethiopians, who insist they have no intention of staying in Somalia. All they want to do, they say, is to eradicate Al-Shabab, the Islamist threat on their eastern border, and enable Somalia to create its first stable central government in more than 20 years. “It’s an issue of national security,” says an Ethiopian diplomat. “Once we get a responsible government, we leave.” The hope is that Baidoa is a big step in that direction. The strategic city, midway between the Ethiopian border and Mogadishu, was under Al-Shabab’s control for three years until the Ethiopians finally drove the militants out on Feb. 22. It was the al Qaeda–linked group’s biggest loss since it pulled out of the Somali capital last August. This month a reporter and photographer for Newsweek were among the first Western journalists in years to visit Baidoa, embedded with the Ethiopian Army.

Evidence of the militants’ hasty retreat from the city is hard to miss. In an overgrown compound just outside the once-lavish entryway of the command center’s main building, a collection of captured weaponry is on display: munitions canisters, mortars, and IEDs, together with an abundance of components for assembling more roadside bombs—switches, detonators, wire, and motorcycle batteries. In another compound nearby there’s an abandoned fleet of “technicals,” the country’s emblematic pickup trucks equipped with gun mounts. In case anyone fails to grasp the Islamists’ threat, Ethiopian military officials routinely refer to Al-Shabab simply as al Qaeda.

Ethiopian Troops Free Baidoa, Somalia, of Terrorist Rule (Photos)

Ethiopian tanks and troops stand guard at the city’s airport. View photos from Somalia. ,
Pete Muller for Newsweek

This isn’t Ethiopia’s first foray into Baidoa. In early 2007, Ethiopian soldiers wrested control of the city from armed factions of the Islamic Courts Union and imposed enough security for Somalia’s pro-Western Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to adopt the town as its provisional capital. Mogadishu, the regular capital, was too dangerous back then. But the would-be national leaders never settled into their temporary home, and the interim government’s institutions never took hold—Parliament had to convene in a converted grain warehouse. “Throughout much of 2008, when [the Ethiopians] controlled the city, that control was contested, and they were not very competent,” says Rashid Abdi, an independent Somalia analyst previously affiliated with the International Crisis Group. “The reality was that they controlled the city without local consent, and many people were happy to see them go.”

Most international analysts conclude that Ethiopia’s 2006–09 Somalia intervention was a failure. It’s true that the Ethiopian Army accomplished the mission it was sent to perform: remove the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from power in Somalia’s southern half. Western governments had worried, the Americans most stridently, that the ICU’s hardline Islamists would allow international terrorists to use the country as a training ground and basing area for global jihad. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian presence ultimately backfired: the defunct ICU gave birth to an even more extremist group, Al-Shabab, which used the “occupation” as a rallying issue to mobilize fighters and whip up Somali public opinion with the group’s fiercely nationalistic, anti-Western rhetoric.

Many Somalis bought it at first. “There was a feeling that Al-Shabab itself—and the faction of Al-Shabab that controlled [Baidoa]—was more in tune with the local clan feelings, with people’s aspirations and interests,” says Abdi. In particular he attributes the militants’ initial popularity to Sheik Muktar Robow, one of the group’s four top leaders. Robow is a native of the region around Baidoa and largely controls it now, and according to Abdi he’s “much more pragmatic” than other Al-Shabab leaders in his willingness to form alliances with local clans.

But Somali opinion was swayed by more than what Abdi calls Al-Shabab’s “softer face.” The Ethiopian soldiers were widely accused of indiscriminate bombardments, rape, and looting. Today that reputation precedes the country’s troops. “Given Ethiopia’s track record in Somalia, and notably the complete impunity granted to its forces in the past, their formal return on Somali soil raises significant concerns,” says Leslie Lefkow, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “We have received allegations of abuses around Beledweyne”—a border town that fell to the Ethiopians in late December—“and are investigating.”

Source : http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/03/11/somalia-on-scene-in-baidoa-after-ethiopia-s-rout-of-al-shabab.html

SOMALIE:1.500 SOLDATS ALLEMANDS, Vendredi 18 décembre 1992

Dans un geste surprenant et sans précédent, le chancelier allemand Helmut Kohl a annoncé jeudi l'envoi en Somalie d'un bataillon de 1.500 soldats allemands pour y accomplir des tâches humanitaires dans les régions déjà pacifiées. Cette décision spectaculaire constitue un nouveau pas dans la tentative du chancelier de faire jouer à l'Allemagne unie un rôle politique et militaire à la mesure de son rang de troisième puissance économique mondiale.

Wiesel Mk20mm d'une unité para allemande sur le port de Mogadiscio.

Le bataillon sera affecté dans les zones déjà pacifiées dans environ six semaines, dès que la deuxième phase de l'opération multinationale commencera, a souligné le chancelier. L'effectif servira surtout à organiser et surveiller la distribution de l'aide alimentaire, mais il comprendra aussi des soldats de l'infanterie pour assurer la protection des autres militaires.

Jamais des soldats allemands en armes n'ont été déployés en dehors des zones de l'OTAN ou du pacte de Varsovie depuis la défaite nazie. L'Allemagne ne peut et ne veut rester à l'écart, a affirmé le chancelier, qui a également dit que l'Allemagne va dès maintenant augmenter le nombre d'avions militaires qui transportent l'aide alimentaire.

Le chancelier a aussi proposé l'envoi de techniciens pour reconstruire le réseau électrique et d'alimentation en eau, ainsi qu'une assistance pour bâtir une police efficace en Somalie.

D'autres pays ont également annoncé l'envoi de forces en Somalie: l'Inde, 2.500 soldats et deux navires, le Maroc, un contingent de 1.250 hommes, le Pakistan, une brigade supplémentaire de 2.500 hommes.

Source: archives.lesoir.be

VINGT-QUATRE PAYS ET 40.000 HOMMES, Jeudi 10 décembre 1992

Les Marines qui ont débarqué en Somalie constituent les premiers éléments de la force mandatée par l'ONU pour l'opération «Restore Hope». Cette force sous commandement américain doit être composée d'environ 40.000 hommes. Vingt-quatre pays doivent y participer dont une dizaine fourniront des troupes.

Colonne de la 10th Mountain Div croisant une section de PsyOps, avec leurs Hummer équipés de haut-parleurs

États-Unis: 28.150 hommes dont un premier contingent composé de nageurs de combat et de 1.800 Marines a débarqué mardi soir et mercredi. Ces éléments seront rejoints par environ 16.000 Marines puis par 10.000 soldats de l'US Army.
France: 2.120 soldats dans le cadre de l'opération «Oryx» dont la moitié basés à Djibouti. Deux bataillons motorisés (1.140 hommes), un détachement d'hélicoptères avec 22 appareils de combat et de transport, un détachement de soutien logistique, une base aéroportuaire et un détachement de commandement et d'état-major. La marine contribuera avec quatre bâtiments et un avion de patrouille.

Italie: entre 1.500 et 2.000 hommes. Cinq navires pourraient partir d'Italie jeudi.
Zimbabwe: environ 1.000 soldats déployés prochainement.
Canada: 900 hommes.
Égypte: 750 hommes.
Pakistan: 500 Casques bleus sont sur place depuis septembre. Des troupes supplémentaires seront envoyées.
Belgique: 587 parachutistes partiront très prochainement. Cent-vingt d'entre-eux arrivent déjà à Mogadiscio aujourd'hui.

Turquie: 300 à 400 fantassins.
Mauritanie: a annoncé la mobilisation de 300 soldats.
Suède: une unité médicale de 134 personnes.
Norvège: pourrait dépêcher 75 hommes.
Grande-Bretagne: (opération «Vigour») Deux avions Hercules C-130 avec une soixantaine de militaires.

Grèce: 40 hommes.
Australie: 30 soldats.
Koweït: une «force symbolique».
Émirats Arabes Unis: une unité des forces armées.
Pays-Bas, Maroc, Nouvelle-Zélande, Hongrie, Argentine: prêts à contribuer.
Russie: pourrait envoyer des médecins et des soldats. Possible participation militaire.
Espagne: aide logistique.
Allemagne: soutien politique et contribution financière «non encore fixée».
Japon: fournira une contribution financière et une aide médicale et humanitaire. (AFP.)

 
Source : archives.lesoir.be

Somalie : les shebab pourraient changer leur nom à la recherche du soutien des musulmans

NAIROBI (Xinhua) - Les insurgés islamistes somaliens shebab envisagent de se donner un nouveau nom, "Emirats islamiques somaliens", afin d'obtenir un soutien plus important des musulmans, alors qu'ils se battent contre l'offensive des forces kenyanes et somaliennes, a affirmé samedi un chef de l'armée kenyane.

Dimanche 11 décembre 2011

Le commandant des opérations des forces de défense kenyanes (KDF), le colonel Cyrus Oguna, a déclaré que les shebab veulent changer leur nom pour se montrer plus attirants parmi les musulmans du monde, notamment ceux qui sont en Somalie.

"Les shebab veulent changer leur nom afin de gagner la sympathie des fidèles musulmans aussi bien en Somalie que dans le monde", a indiqué Oguna lors d'un point de presse à Nairobi.

L'opération militaire des forces somaliennes et kenyanes, qui ont duré huit semaines, a perturbé les activités des insurgés.

Lindsay Kiptiness, directeur adjoint au ministère kenyan des Affaires étrangères pour les affaires de la Corne de l'Afrique, avait révélé que les militaires kenyans pourraient mener leurs opérations sous la bannière de la Mission de l'Union africaine en Somalie (Amison) dès que l'UE et le Conseil de sécurité de l'Onu approuvent le plan.

Le Conseil de sécurité de l'UA avait formellement demandé au Kenya d'intégrer ses troupes dans l'Amison, alors que Nairobi exige un mandat autorisant à se défendre et à attaquer les avant- postes des rebelles somaliens.

Lors d'une visite au Kenya et en Somalie, le secrétaire général de l'ONU, Ban Ki-moon, s'est dit favorable à une fusion entre les troupes de l'Amisom et celles du Kenya.

Selon Kiptiness, le sommet des pays des Grands Lacs qui aura lieu la semaine prochaine et le prochain sommet de l'UA, prévu en janvier 2012, devraient aussi approuver les actions du Kenya en Somalie.

Source : http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2011/12/11/afrique-orientale-192652.asp

Somalia conflict: Visiting al-Shabab fallen stronghold

5 March 2012

Inside former al-Shabab stronghold

The Ethiopian army - along with Somali pro-government troops - has recently captured the key al-Shabab stronghold of Baidoa.

The BBC's East Africa correspondent Will Ross was one of the first journalists to visit the town since its seizure from the Islamist militants.

The dark red berets of the Ethiopian army are back in Baidoa.

At the airstrip, there was plenty of military might on display: hulking tanks, heavy artillery and dozens of alert troops.

We are told Somali pro-government soldiers were backed by the Ethiopians as they seized the town from al-Shabab but it is clear who is the dominant partner in this relationship.

Inside Baidoa's presidential palace there are signs of the just departed Islamist militants. The walls of this battered, squalid building are covered in jihadist graffiti - mostly images of guns apparently drawn by very young al-Shabab recruits.

"They preach to them, so these kids think only about jihad," says Ethiopian army Capt Mahammud Yissak.

"We saw very small guys between eight and 12. They had been in the al-Shabab training camps. They ran away and we welcomed them. Some of them were used as couriers to plant explosives."

'Colonised'

On display in the compound were the ingredients of the brand of terror preferred by al-Shabab these days: detonators, batteries and switches for bombs or mines that can be set off by remote control.

Nearby were several technicals (the four-wheel drive vehicles with machine guns mounted on the back) that had been captured from or abandoned by al-Shabab.

The militants put up little resistance when the tanks and troops closed in on the town but since then al-Shabab has promised blood in Baidoa.

It is extraordinary to think that just over three years ago Somalis were cheering on the streets as the Ethiopian army made its very public withdrawal from the country.

That incursion ousted the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which controlled much of the country.

But the Ethiopian presence became so unpopular - partly as a result of the shelling of civilian areas of the capital, Mogadishu - that it then helped trigger the rise of the more radical al-Shabab.



Baidoa elders say they "welcome our brothers from Ethiopia"



"Never again" was Ethiopia's view on another major military incursion in Somalia, but - with al-Shabab threatening the stability of the entire region - it felt forced to act.

On an embedded visit with the Ethiopian army, it was always going to be hard to gauge the sentiments of Baidoa's residents.

In front of Ethiopian soldiers a group of elders stroked their henna dyed beards as they spoke to the media.

"We welcome our brothers from Ethiopia. We work with them. We've had many meetings with Ethiopian commanders to help stabilise this place," says Moalimu Ali.

"Al-Shabab colonised us for three years and 12 days. So many of us were killed or displaced. They forced our youth to join them. We are telling them to leave al-Shabab."

Hearts and minds battle 

Al-Shabab's extremist views and its appalling handling of the recent famine make it widely unpopular amongst Somalia's population.

This certainly dilutes any hostility there might be to Ethiopia's current intervention.

It was a very different situation in 2006 when the ICU had brought a degree of peace to this troubled nation and had considerable support.

Ethiopia's military action back then was strongly backed by the US that feared the rise of the Islamists - a position Washington might regret now in view of what has happened since.

But is there a danger of Ethiopia getting bogged down in this complicated conflict and once again being portrayed as an unwanted foreign force?

"I don't think so - we don't want to stay long," says Capt Yissak.

"We want to stabilise Somalia. After the country has settled we'll leave. People are asking us to stay for a long time. Our government says stay until peace comes, then we go back.

"We are training the government police and military, and after they've become strong we will leave."

But there are signs that Ethiopia may find it hard to win over all the hearts and minds.

Al-Shabab has warned businesses not to co-operate with the new men in charge, and many shops have remained closed.

This is partly because people feel the battle for Baidoa may not be over. It is not clear how long the Ethiopians will stay, so there is a fear that al-Shabab could return and carry out retribution.

Fighting, not talking
In February 2006, Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) set up home in Baidoa as Mogadishu was too dangerous.
The country's third-largest city then fell into the hands of al-Shabab in January 2009 - straight after the Ethiopians had withdrawn.
One man who is glad to be back home is Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade, a former minister in the TFG and a local MP.


Al-Shabab has warned local residents not to co-operate
with the new authorities



"I was the last out of Baidoa when the government left and I was the first one to return. I am happy to be back… but many things are destroyed," he says.

"It's like Baidoa was hit by an earthquake - al-Qaeda is like an earthquake.

"People are requesting the Ethiopian troops to stay for a long time. People have become free in the last 10 days. Now they need a lot of humanitarian support," Mr Habsade adds.

He is amongst the politicians of the Bay and Bakol region hoping to establish a self-governing state under a federal government.

But would al-Shabab fighters, like the senior commander Sheikh Mukhtar Robow who is from Baidoa, be welcome to join that administration?

"Not only Robow. All of them would be welcome if they leave the terrorists, changed their way of thinking and came to live peacefully."

Before dismissing the idea of an al-Shabab commander rising to help run a legitimate administration, it is worth remembering what became of the head of the UIC after the group was swept from power by Ethiopian troops. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is now Somalia's president.

For now though al-Shabab appears to be more focused on fighting than talking.

Just hours before I flew into Somalia, al-Shabab fought for hours in an effort to capture Garbaharey, 150km (95 miles) to the west of Baidoa.

Then hours after I had left Somalia there was an explosion in Baidoa, and the authorities rounded up dozens of men on suspicion of al-Shabab links.

The militants are weakened but they are not finished.

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/

Deux groupes de pirates somaliens interceptés en quelques jours par la frégate Aconit

10 avril 2012 – 14:00

Le 7 avril dernier, comme prévu, le contre-amiral français Jean-Baptiste Dupuis a pris le commandement de la Task Force 465, c’est à dire de la force navale européenne déployée au large de la corne de l’Afrique dans le cadre de la mission anti-piraterie Atalante.

Les opérations seront désormais coordonnées depuis le Bâtiment de commandement et de Ravitaillement (BCR) Marne alors que l’on entre dans une période dite d’inter-mousson, propice à la reprise de l’activité des pirates somaliens en raison de l’amélioration des conditions météorologiques.

Cela étant, la prise de commandement du contre-amiral Dupuis a commencé sous les meilleurs auspices car une frégate française, engagée au sein de la TF 465, s’est illustrée le même jour en mettant en échec un groupe de pirates.

En effet, alors qu’elle devait rejoindre le nord de la corne de l’Afrique pour y retrouver le bâtiment espagnol Infanta Elena, afin d’assuer l’escorte d’un navire du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), la frégate Aconit, arrivée sur zone en février pour relever le Floréal, repère une baleinière remorquant un skiff, à 600 km des côtes.

Et, étant donné qu’aucune activité de pêche n’est alors observée par les marins français, l’ordre d’intercepter le bateau suspect est donné par le commandant de l’Aconit. Ce qui sera fait quelques minutes plus tard par l’équipe de visite de la frégate française, qui, à bord d’un Etraco (embarcation rapide) rejoint la baleinière et ses 8 occupants, lesquels ont eu cependant le temps de jeter par dessus bord une partie de leur équipement.

Cela étant, du matériel est toutefois saisi et les pirates présumés ainsi que le skiff sont alors transférés à bord de la frégate pendant que la baleinière est coulée. Seulement, étant donné qu’il n’y avait pas de preuves flagrantes à l’endroit des 8 hommes interpellés, ces derniers ont été remis en liberté près des côtes somaliennes.

Tout comme cela fut le cas pour une autre interception ayant impliqué l’Aconit, le 27 mars dernier. Mise en alerte après une tentative d’assaut contre un pétrolier immatriculé à Hong Kong et repoussé par l’équipe de protection embarquée qui avait pris place à bord de ce dernier, la frégate française, qui naviguait dans un secteur proche, intercepta, grâce aux informations fournies par un avion de surveillance maritime luxembourgeois, une baleinière avec 10 pirates présumés à bord et un skiff.

Seulement, ces derniers eurent le temps de se débarrasser de tout le matériel susceptible de les compromettre après le survol de leur bateau par l’hélicoptère Panther de la frégate française. Finalement, ils furent relâchés, faute de preuve et ils n’eurent à déplorer que la perte de leur embarcation, envoyée par le fond.

Pour qu’ils aient éventuellement à répondre devant la justice – et il est d’ailleurs assez compliqué pour trouver une juridiction, faute d’état de droit en Somalie – il faut que les pirates soient pris la main dans le sac. C’est, par exemple, ce qui est arrivé à 9 d’entre eux, le 6 avril. Ces derniers, qui venaient de capturer un cargo chinois (le Xianghuamen) dans le golfe d’Oman, ont été capturés par la marine iranienne, qui avaient mis deux navires sur le coup, répondant ainsi à une demande de Pékin.

Source : http://www.opex360.com/