UNITED STATES PSYOP IN SOMALIA (3/4)

Herbert A. Friedman

The UNITAF authority desired to reward certain Somalis who had been helpful to the United Nations forces. They printed a bright yellow cardboard "gift certificate" depicting the 21 flags of the coalition nations and English text on one side, and the flags of the United Nations and Somalia with the same message in both English and Somali text on the other side. The all-English text is, "The holder of this note is entitled to a bag of wheat, to be issued at the stadium complex. This Somali citizen has made a contribution to the Coalition forces by providing useful information. The information assisted Task Force Mogadishu with locating criminal elements, weapons cache sites, the surrendering of a personal weapon or crew served weapons. Treat this Somali citizen with respect and dignity. Authorized signature." The duplicate text on the mixed side of the card is, "Thank you for helping us make your city more peaceful. Please take this note to the Marines at the gate of Mogadishu stadium. You will receive wheat as a token of our gratitude. Consider us your friends. Together, with your assistance, we can make Mogadishu a peaceful city for the future of your children."

MEDCAP Booklet

Booklets and leaflets were also produced in support of MEDCAP. The booklets were printed in both English and Somali and addressed various health concerns, such as malaria, food sanitation, and hand washing. The booklet depicted above is an example of such a MEDCAP publication, designed by the Product Development Center, B Company, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne) in support of Operation NATURAL FIRE, a joint operation between the U.S., Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania circa 1998 in East Africa. 

Among the oversized (5 1/2 x 8 1/2 inch) leaflets, one depicts a hospital on the front. The text in English is "UNOSOM II MEDCAP." People gather in front of the hospital protected by armed humvees. The back is all text and shows the flags of Somalia and the United Nations.

Another oversized leaflet is identical on front and back and depicts a doctor at the left and Somali text at the right

UNITAF newspaper RAJO (Hope)

We will now discuss the UNITAF newspaper RAJO. The 4th PSYOP Group booklet says about RAJO:

The daily Somali language newspaper RAJO was first published on 20 December 1992 printed on both sides of 8 1/2 x 14 inch paper. RAJO was distributed to every town and village where UNITAF was deployed…the JPOTF published up to 28,000 copies of RAJO daily; however, average daily publication quantities often did not exceed 15,000 copies because the supply of paper was limited and it was necessary to reduce wear and tear on the print presses.

UNITAF Somalia PSYOP Themes that were incorporated into RAJO included:

Explain that the UNITAF rules of engagement are applied fairly regardless of faction or position. Highlight that UNITAF does not support or favor any faction.

Reinforce that Somalia's problems can only be resolved by Somalis, that UNITAF and relief agencies can only assist the process. Highlight the roles and capabilities of the 22 nations participating in UNITAF, particularly those from Africa and the Islamic world. Highlight the seamless transition from UNITAF to United Nations Operations in Somalia; emphasizing that there will be no change in the rules of engagement or troop performance. Encourage displaced persons to return to their homes to harvest crops and plant fields. Highlight the redevelopment and re-establishment of Somalia's infrastructure. Highlight the agreements made by faction leaders and the consequences for violating those agreements. Focus on the disarmament, keeping everyone apprised of the progress in each Humanitarian Relief Sector.

PSYOP Soldier passes outcopies of RAJO on the streets of Kisymo, Somalia.

LTC Borchini comments:

Four days after the arrival of the main contingent of forces in Mogadishu, the JPOTF began publishing a daily newspaper and broadcasting a daily radio program — both called “Rajo,” which is Somali for “hope.” At the beginning of operations, the Rajo publishing and editorial staff included 4th PSYOP Group soldiers and civilian specialists as well as Somali linguists from the U.S. Rajo articles covered a number of relevant issues but generally focused on military operations to secure Mogadishu and each of the major towns, humanitarian relief provided to the famine areas, redevelopment efforts, hope for the future and analyses of the reconciliation and national-unity process.

Regular features included interviews with relief-agency staff, public-health information on treating common childhood diseases, the status of security in each humanitarian-relief sector, reports on rebuilding the educational system and judicial institutions, and forming local police forces and security councils. As a complement to the newspaper, the JPOTF established Radio Rajo, a 45-minute, Somali-language program transmitted twice daily on AM/medium wave, FM and shortwave. The program included readings from the Koran, Rajo newspaper articles, selections of Somali poetry and short stories, news about Africa, significant events throughout the world and Somali music. The programs broadcast over shortwave eventually reached every city and town in Somalia where UNITAF forces were located.

One of the most popular features of the newspaper was a cartoon devoted to the comments and the observations of a Somali man named Celmi (after the U.S. Navy sailor who was born in Somalia and served as a linguist for the JPOTF) and his wise friend, the camel Mandeeq. The dialogue between these two characters reinforced various PSYOP themes and described specific aspects of the UNITAF mission.

Barton Gellmann discussed the newspaper RAJO in an article entitled "GIs Edit Daily to Tranquilize Mogadishu" in The Washington Post, 24 December 1992. He says in part:

Specialist Jeffrey Hood, a cartoonist, draws a daily strip featuring a young man named Celmi and his camel Maandeeq. ‘Originally I was going to use a donkey but it turns out that certain clans are associated with donkeys, and others aren't, and we don't want to get into that.’ ‘Hey, what is that?’ the camel asks in the first cartoon of the series. ‘It is a leaflet. It says that the combined task force is here to protect supplies for the Somali people,’ Celmi replies. ‘Oh, that is good. There has been enough suffering already’." The author points out that some Somali gunmen were not impressed. "Look here," says one, outraged, "Here is the camel and here is the man. They are talking. They are saying that we are like animals."

The 4th PSYOP booklet mentions the use of radio as a PSYOP medium.

As a compliment to the RAJO newspaper, the JPOTF established a radio station on the US Embassy compound. Radio RAJO conducted a 45-minute Somali language broadcast twice daily on AM, FM, and short wave. The program included a reading from the Koran, a reading of the RAJO newspaper articles, selections of Somali poetry and short stories, news about Africa, significant events throughout the world, and Somali music. After extensive antenna adjustments, the radio programs broadcasted over short wave eventually reached every city and town in Somalia where UNITAF forces were deployed. Guided by a broadcast journalist from the 4th PSYOP Group's PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB), Somali staff members, PSYOP specialists and civilian analysts worked together to develop articles. For example, to encourage Somali clans to put aside their differences and rebuild their country, JPOTF staff members traveled to Marka where they interviewed President Abdullah Usmaan, Somalia's first head of state and an important symbol of national unity. Excerpts from his interview were published in the RAJO newspaper and broadcast over the radio.

The quality of the PSYOP radio improved with the arrival of Abdullah Omar Mohammed. He was a naturalized citizen who was born in Mogadishu, and a contract interpreter for the State Department. He told the Americans not to broadcast a weather report. Weather comes from Allah, and it would be presumptuous for the Americans to attempt to guess what God might do next. He also insisted that the broadcasts start with a passage from the Koran. The station then played a Somali song and the local news. After that, the station played upbeat American music, which was a favorite of many Somalis.

Radio Rajo began broadcasting with 600 watts. It was first heard on 1480 kHz but in January 1993 was heard on the short-wave frequency 9540 kHz.  The humanitarian mission was multinational so the station later identified itself as the "Voice of the United Task Force." When UNOSOM II took over the station it became Radio Manta (Today) broadcasting on both the old frequency of 9540 kHz as well as 6170 kHz. Italian psychological operations troops also broadcast Radio Ibis on 89.7 MHZ FM.

In the book Battle Ready, by Tom Clancy, with General Tony Zinni (Ret) and Tony Koltz, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, NY, 2004, General Tony Zinni (Ret.), Director of Operations, Somalia Task Force, 1992-1993 and Commander of the Combined Task Force protecting the withdrawal of UN Forces from Somalia in 1993 wrote:

One of my responsibilities was to coordinate our psychological and tactical operations.

Though there were plenty of sources of "information," the Somalis had little access to accurate news accounts. Most Somali news sources -- notably, Aideed's--,were nothing but propaganda ... much of it inflammatory. We published leaflets and a newspaper, and set up a radio station, to counter the lies. The paper and radio station, which were called "Rajo"--"hope" in Somali--made Aideed very unhappy; and he counterattacked through his own radio station. A period of "radio wars" ensued.

When he summoned me to his compound to complain about our broadcasts, I told him we’d tone down our broadcasts when he toned down his own inflammatory rhetoric. He agreed.

Another victory for nonviolent engagement.

According to Dr. Robert Cialdini of Arizona State University, Aideed had an understanding of PSYOP:

Somali warlord Mohammed Aideed … distributed toy rifles to Somali children, hoping that some would be mistaken for real rifles by UN troops, prompting them to fire on Somali children, which would make great propaganda against UN troops. The UN recognized this danger and ran influence campaigns, which were unsuccessful in convincing Somali parents to turn in the toy guns. It was only when the head of the Somali Women’s Organization, who was trusted in the community, urged their surrender that the toy guns were turned in.

The Italian PSYOP Contingent

The Italian military contingent in Somalia produced PSYOP leaflets, newspapers and radio broadcasts. Lieutenant Colonel Charles P. Borchini said more about the Italian PSYOP campaign in his personal monograph "Psychological Operations Support for Operation Restore Hope." He says:

The Italian forces came to Somalia confident in their ability to deal with the Somali people. Based on their historical relations, many Somalis spoke Italian, and the Italians believed that they would have a special relationship with the Somalis. This probably was true to some extent.

I paid the Italian force headquarters a visit. I met their Civil Affairs and PSYOP officer...He showed me several leaflets they had designed, translated into Somali and printed in Italy. They were color, high quality products, that used the phrase "help us to help you" that we adopted and used. One of the leaflets pictured an Italian doctor and nurse treating a baby; however, the baby they were treating was white. We discussed the issue that all PSYOP products must be approved through the J3 (Operations) to insure a singularly focused, well coordinated PSYOP effort, and how we could produce any PSYOP product they needed.

Borchini adds that the Italians also produced a bi-weekly newspaper for distribution in Mogadishu. The Italians had their own radio station, and although once again the Americans worried that they were producing independent PSYOP that might go against the JTF scheme, it turned out that, the station only broadcast music and messages from Italy for the Italian armed forces. The few messages that they did send to the Somali people were concerning medical treatment and vaccinations.

About the Italian operation Borchini concludes:

Although my initial feelings were that only the JTF should produce leaflets or a newspaper, or run a radio station, the intent of the Italians was pure. They wanted only to foster good relationships and promote peace, security and development in Somalia. Through close coordination, we were able to harness their efforts along with ours to maximize the overall PSYOP impact.

The German PSYOP Contingent

This German operation is discussed in an interesting 1999 British Joint Services Command and Staff Defense Research Paper by Chef de Bataillon, M. E. Limon. He says in part:

The German PSYOP organization is Das Fernmeldebataillon 950 Operative Information (FmBtl 950-OpInfo). This battalion, based in Andernach, consists of 709 regular personnel. The Battalion consists of a Headquarters Company; Company Two produces radio and television programs (live or video); Company Three provides all printing capabilities; and Company Four provides loudspeaker teams. A 93-man “Quick Reaction Force” is kept on alert. The Germans normally deploy a small number of personnel to the theater of war, while all the PSYOP products are planned and designed in the Germany-based Headquarters Company. Their mission was to explain the role and objectives of the German forces to the local population, to explain the objectives of the UNOSOM II forces, and to maintain morale of the German troops.

The German element deployed to Somalia was composed of 20 personnel in three teams; a functional Headquarters (4 personnel), a printed products team (12 personnel), and a loudspeaker team (4 personnel and four loudspeaker trucks).

The OpInfo Battalion printed 16,000 copies a week of the newspaper IRRIDA NABADA (“The Gates of Peace”). In addition, they printed 87,000 leaflets and 4,500 posters, many on the subject of landmine awareness. They regularly took part in loudspeaker broadcasts and produced a weekly 45 minute radio program. The personnel remaining in Germany produced leaflets and pocket guides for the German soldiers and 118 hours of radio programs to maintain the morale of their personnel.

The German PSYOP unit explains its Somalia responsibilities thusly:

UNOSOM was the first UN deployment for the PSYOPS forces: From 19 to 29 May 1993 the first two soldiers of Signal Battalion 950 were on duty as a reconnaissance and advance party of the German support unit in Somalia.

On the basis of the reconnaissance results the battalion was assigned the following mission:

1. Distribute information on the mission of the German UN forces among the Somali population.

2. Support non-violent resolution of conflicts.

3. Support troops by providing field postcards and special postmarks and broadcasts by “Radio Andernach” from Andernach, Germany.

4. Produce target audience radio programs for the Somali population to support and explain the UNOSOM II mission.

Originally, this mission was to be carried out by 19 soldiers. As it was impossible to support non-violent resolution of conflicts without the use of loudspeakers, a loudspeaker team of 4 was added.

In the course of the deployment, numerous products were produced by the PSYOPS forces, including flyers, posters and newspapers such as “Gateway to Peace” for the Somali population.

The first UN deployment in the history of Signal Battalion 950 ended on 23 March 1994 with the final parade and deactivation ceremony for the support unit in Köln-Wahn.

PSYOP Loudspeaker Humvee with Patrol

The 4th PSYOP booklet also mentions the use of loudspeaker teams in Somalia,

From the initial landing on the beach at Mogadishu to the transition to UNOSOM II, the eight loudspeaker teams participating in Operation Restore Hope faced many different challenges. The loudspeaker teams broadcasted numerous messages, including surrender appeals, instructions during weapons sweeps and at roadblocks and announcements to organize crowds at feeding sites. Loudspeaker teams also distributed the UNITAF newspaper RAJO in many of the major towns and villages in each humanitarian relief sector.

As loudspeaker teams were attached to Army and Marine forces in each of the humanitarian service sectors, they were given the responsibility and authority to request specific leaflets based on the situation confronting each maneuver commander

The heliborne PSYOP personnel also disseminated leaflets informing the people of Mogadishu that the objective of the operation was to improve security in the city. It was earlier noted that children liked to chase the leaflets, which also provided a simple and effective way to draw them out of the way of the potentially dangerous areas being searched.

UNOSOM II

UNITAF was a moderate success. Most Somalis were being fed and there was a reasonable amount of law and order within the country. The United Nations was not satisfied. Besides the earlier ongoing missions, UNOSOM II was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure. Force was authorized. The mission that started with feeding the Somali people and protecting food convoys had become one of building a new society. This is sometimes called "mission creep." That required the neutralization of the warlords, and would lead directly to the American military disaster popularly depicted in the book and movie "Blackhawk Down."

But first, we must mention a lesser known loss of a Blackhawk helicopter that led directly to a PSYOP leaflet being prepared and dropped over Mogadishu. 

Somali Militiamen on wreckage of “Courage 53”

At 0200 on 25 September 1993, during a night reconnaissance mission over Mogadishu, a 101st Airborne Division UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter with the call sign "Courage 53" was hit by a rocket propelled grenade. The explosion ignited the fuel and brought down the aircraft. As the helicopter fell from the sky in flames, the pilot tried to steer it toward friendly forces occupying the seaport. Instead, the helicopter hit the top of a building and then fell to the ground and skidded over a hundred yards before it came to rest against an embankment.

PFC Matthew K. Anderson, SGT Ferdinan C. Richardson, and SGT Eugene Williams were killed in the fiery crash. Chief Warrant Officer Dale Shrader the pilot, and Chief Warrant Officer Perry Alliman the co-pilot, survived the crash.

Shrader's arm was broken and Alliman was badly burned and blinded. Somali militiamen rushed to the scene and opened fire on the two Americans with AK-47s and hand grenades. Shrader fought them off and killed at least one attacker. In the midst of the firefight a friendly Somali approached the two Americans waving a flashlight and yelling “American boys!” They had no choice but to trust him. He led Alliman and Shrader to a nearby United Arab Emirates unit that was securing the seaport. That Somali saved their lives.

“Thank you Mogadishu” leaflet

After the attack, in an attempt to foster friendship with the Somali people, UNOSOM printed a leaflet thanking the good citizens of Mogadishu for their help in rescuing the two Americans. The front of the leaflet depicts the downed helicopter, the two injured pilots, the Somali that guided them and others who point the way to safety. Text on the back is:

Thank you Mogadishu. Three UNOSOM soldiers died during the attack on a helicopter last Saturday. But other UNOSOM soldiers were saved by the actions of the brave Somali rescuers. These rescuers are heroes, and UNOSOM salutes them. Their actions bring great honor on themselves and Somalia. 

Michael Clauss who served in Somalia from July 1993 to March 1994 as a sergeant (E5) with the 10th Aviation Brigade (10th Mountain Division) in the Quick Reaction Force S-2 (intelligence section) adds:

We eventually found the Somali who helped the crew and offered him a reward. He asked for a job instead.

In May 1993, all the parties involved in the civil war agreed to a disarmament conference proposed by Mohammed Farah Aideed, the leading Somali warlord. However, on 5 June, 24 Pakistani troops in the UN forces were killed in an ambush in an area of Mogadishu controlled by Aideed. On 8 August his forces detonated a mine under a passing U.S. Military Police vehicle on

Jialle-Siaad Street

in Mogadishu killing four U.S. MPs. The UN passed resolution 837 calling for the arrest of all involved. On 22 August Task Force Ranger deployed to Somalia under the name Operation Gothic Serpent. The Task Force was made up of U. S. Army Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment, 130 members of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta Force), and 16 helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Regiment (Night Stalkers). During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were tactical successes, although in one instance the task force members mistakenly raided an unlisted UN facility and temporarily restrained some UN employees.

On the afternoon of 3 October 1993, the task force received intelligence that foreign minister Omar Salad and top political advisor Mohamed Hassan Awale, two of Aideed's Habr Gidr clan leaders, were in central Mogadishu. The task force sent 19 aircraft, 12 vehicles, and 160 men to arrest them under Operation Irene. The two leaders were quickly arrested along with a number of other suspects. During the action, two MH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were struck by rocket propelled grenades and crashed. The end result was a 15-hour pitched battle that resulted in 18 American combat deaths and 73 wounded in action. The Somalis desecrated the bodies of the American soldiers and television stations around the world broadcast the scenes. The soldiers could not be rescued by tanks or heavy armored vehicles because Clinton Defense Secretary Les Aspin had personally turned down repeated requests for heavier armor, believing that the sight of such weapons would make the Americans appear to be on a mission of conquest rather than peacekeeping. One American, Chief Warrant Office Mike Durant was taken hostage, but was returned to American forces on 14 October 1993. Operation Gothic Serpent ended on 13 October 1993. Following these events, the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a joint task force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. At the same time, United States President William Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Secretary Aspin resigned under fire at the end of 1993.

To be continued

Source : http://www.psywarrior.com/SomaliaHerb.html